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Section 1252(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides that “no court
shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising
from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien.” The Eighth and Ninth
Circuits disagree about whether this provision precludes judicial review over claims
brought by noncitizens who are wrongfully removed from the United States. This
Comment advances four arguments for why § 1252(g) should be interpreted narrowly to allow federal jurisdiction over such claims by looking to Supreme Court
precedent, legislative history, and public policy: First, Supreme Court precedent suggests that § 1252(g) may apply to only the Attorney General’s discretionary decisions,
and wrongful removal is never in the Attorney General’s discretion. Second, precedent and legislative history support a narrow interpretation of the phrase “arising
from” in § 1252(g). Third, the plain language of the statute indicates that § 1252(g)
may not be implicated when the Attorney General wrongfully removes someone from
the United States. Finally, interpreting the statute narrowly is the best normative
outcome because it restrains improper executive action and prevents harm to
noncitizens.
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INTRODUCTION
A foreign national is set to testify under subpoena to a grand
jury about detainee abuse by certain Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) agents. The district court has issued an order
prohibiting the ICE agents from removing the foreign national
from the United States. But the foreign national’s testimony is
damaging, and the ICE agents would rather deport him than allow him to testify. Believing that 8 USC § 1252(g) strips federal
courts of jurisdiction to review their action, the ICE agents intentionally remove the foreign national in violation of the court’s order. Can courts exercise jurisdiction over the agents’ actions?
The Ninth Circuit posed this hypothetical to the Government
during oral arguments in Arce v United States.1 The Government
reluctantly admitted that, under their theory, § 1252(g) would
preclude judicial review of the ICE agents’ actions.2 Section 1252(g) states that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear
any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the

1

899 F3d 796 (9th Cir 2018).
Oral Argument, Arce v United States, No 16-56706, 0:13:33–0:16:22 (9th Cir May
15, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/C97X-BEBT.
2
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decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.”3
This Comment considers whether § 1252(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 19654 (INA of 1965) precludes the exercise of federal jurisdiction over claims brought by noncitizens
who are wrongfully removed5 from the United States. It was inspired by a recent circuit split between the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. Both circuits addressed whether a noncitizen6 who was
wrongfully removed from the United States in violation of a courtordered stay of removal could assert a Federal Tort Claims Act7
(FTCA) claim against the government. In August 2017, the
Eighth Circuit held in Silva v United States8 that § 1252(g) strips
federal courts of jurisdiction when a noncitizen is wrongfully removed from the country.9 One year later, the Ninth Circuit held
in Arce that § 1252(g) should be interpreted narrowly to allow federal jurisdiction over wrongful removals.10
This Comment analyzes Supreme Court case law, legislative
history, and public policy to conclude that § 1252(g) should be interpreted narrowly. Specifically, it builds on a line of cases holding that capacious statutory language—like “arising from” in
§ 1252(g)—should be interpreted in accordance with legislative
history and common sense. These considerations weigh in favor
of a narrow interpretation of § 1252(g) because allowing wrongful
removal suits does not frustrate the provision’s purpose of limiting frivolous lawsuits and expediting the removal process. A narrow interpretation is also normatively appealing: the executive’s

3
8 USC § 1252(g). Although the statute refers to the Attorney General, Congress
transferred the Attorney General’s immigration enforcement responsibilities to the
Department of Homeland Security. 6 USC § 202(3). See Clark v Martinez, 543 US 371,
374 n 1 (2005).
4
Pub L No 89-236, 79 Stat 911, codified as amended at 8 USC § 1101 et seq.
5
In this Comment, the phrase “wrongfully removed” refers only to situations in
which an individual is deported in violation of a court order, statute, or government regulation. For more discussion on the scope of “wrongful removal,” see Part II.A.
6
Following the Supreme Court, I use the term “noncitizen” throughout this Comment to refer to any person who is not a citizen or national of the United States. See, for
example, Pereira v Sessions, 138 S Ct 2105, 2110 n 1 (2018).
7
60 Stat 842 (1946), codified as amended in various sections of Title 28. The plaintiff in Arce, for example, raised claims of negligence, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, false arrest, and false imprisonment. Arce, 899 F3d at 799.
8
866 F3d 938 (8th Cir 2017).
9
Id at 939.
10 Arce, 899 F3d at 800.
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violation of the law should not escape judicial review. Furthermore, interpreting the provision narrowly prevents harm to
noncitizens, restrains improper executive action, and maintains
consistency with the presumption in favor of judicial review.
This issue is particularly salient in today’s political climate.
In 2018, more than 256,000 people were deported.11 Even when
the government abides by all relevant laws and regulations, the
deportation process is dehumanizing and humiliating. Individuals may be held in detention for more than a year,12 and many
have been held for years without a hearing to determine if their
continued detention was justified.13 Children may be separated
from their parents,14 and prison staff may treat detainees as if
they were in punitive custody.15 Some detention centers are even
run by private companies that stand to profit at the expense of
detainees.16 Although wrongfully removed noncitizens are only a
subset of this population, allowing them to sue can help prevent
these harms from occurring and give some noncitizens recourse
when they occur.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief
history of US immigration law, including the origins and subsequent interpretation of § 1252(g). Part II describes the circuit
split over the scope of § 1252(g). Part III argues that § 1252(g)
should be interpreted narrowly to allow federal jurisdiction when
the government removes someone in violation of a court order, a
statute, or its own regulations.

11 US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Fiscal Year 2018 ICE Enforcement and
Removal Operations Report *10 (Dec 14, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/F4CT-YTNW.
12 See Denise Gilman, Realizing Liberty: The Use of International Human Rights
Law to Realign Immigration Detention in the United States, 36 Fordham Intl L J 243, 255
n 44 (2013).
13 See Jennings v Rodriguez, 138 S Ct 830, 838, 842–48 (2018) (holding that detained
noncitizens do not have a right to periodic bond hearings).
14 Under President Donald J. Trump’s immigration policy, migrant children were
separated from their parents or guardians when they entered the United States. Even
after an executive order formally ended routine family separations at the border, more
than two hundred children were taken from their families and forced to spend potentially
months in shelters and foster homes thousands of miles away. Miriam Jordan and Caitlin
Dickerson, Hundreds of Migrant Children Are Taken from Families Despite Rollback of
Separation Policy (Boston Globe, Mar 9, 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/A7YE-PPLR.
15 See Michelle Brané and Christiana Lundholm, Human Rights behind Bars: Advancing the Rights of Immigration Detainees in the United States through Human Rights
Frameworks, 22 Georgetown Immig L J 147, 149, 162 (2008).
16 See Jaden Urbi, Here’s Who’s Making Money from Immigration Enforcement
(CNBC, June 29, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/QRM7-VRFD.
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I. BACKGROUND
Evaluating the legislative history and purpose of § 1252(g)
requires understanding the history of immigration law in the
United States and the context in which the Immigration and Nationality Act was passed. This Part briefly summarizes that history. I first describe the political and social evolution of US immigration law from the Founding to 1965. I then introduce the INA
of 1965 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 199617 (IIRIRA). Finally, I detail the purpose of
§ 1252(g) and its twin goals of facilitating expedient removal and
limiting frivolous lawsuits.
A.

US Immigration Law and Policy from the Founding to 1965

Federal immigration policy was relatively unrestricted for
white Europeans in the first hundred years of the United States’
existence.18 The nation’s growing economy required new workers,
and the government was eager to take a relatively welcoming approach to immigration.19 The first US immigration law, passed in
1790, specified that “any alien, being a free white person” could
apply for citizenship as long as he or she had “resided within the
limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for the term
of two years.”20 Racial restriction remained an explicit part of naturalization law until 1952.21
After the Civil War, US immigration policy became significantly more restrictive. Immigrants, especially Chinese laborers,
had become an increasing percentage of the workforce. When the
economy entered a depression in 1873, many people blamed the
Chinese.22 In 1882, the Chinese Exclusion Act23 suspended Chinese

17

Pub L No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009-546, codified as amended at 8 USC § 1101 et seq.
David Weissbrodt, Immigration Law and Procedure in a Nutshell 3–6 (West 3d
ed 1992).
19 Id.
20 Naturalization Act of 1790, ch 3, 1 Stat 103.
21 Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat 163 (1952), codified as amended at 8
USC § 1101 et seq. See also Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference
in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 Cal L Rev 1923, 1947–48 (2000).
22 Gabriel J. Chin and Daniel K. Tu, Comprehensive Immigration Reform in the Jim
Crow Era: Chinese Exclusion and the McCreary Act of 1893, 23 Asian Am L J 39, 40–42
(2016). In fact, the very first sentence of the Chinese Exclusion Act reads, “Whereas, in
the opinion of the Government of the United States the coming of Chinese laborers to this
country endangers the good order of certain localities within the territory thereof.” Chinese
Exclusion Act, ch 126, 22 Stat 58 (1882).
23 22 Stat 58 (1882).
18

1660

The University of Chicago Law Review

[86:1655

laborer immigration, prohibited Chinese naturalization, and allowed for the deportation of Chinese people illegally present in
the United States.24 In opposition to the Act, one senator stated,
“The true intent and meaning of it is to declare that henceforth,
excepting only the Chinese now here, and the colored people now
here, no man shall work in the United States except he be a white
man.”25 In upholding the Chinese Exclusion Act’s constitutionality, the Supreme Court highlighted the widespread belief that
Chinese immigrants were a “menace to our civilization.”26
Twelve years later, in 1894, Congress passed a statute limiting judicial review of immigration decisions. The Act stated, “In
every case where an alien is excluded from admission into the
United States . . . the decision of the appropriate immigration or
customs officers, if adverse to the admission of such alien, shall
be final, unless reversed on appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury.”27 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this
provision in 1895.28
Immigration was popularly seen as a threat to the US economy by the 1890s.29 The Immigration Act of 189130 established the
Office of the Superintendent of Immigration, which was responsible for inspecting entrants at the ports of entry to the United
States.31 The Act allowed for the deportation of any noncitizen entering the United States unlawfully, and it provided that “[a]ll
decisions made by the inspection officers or their assistants
touching the right of any alien to land, when adverse to such
right, shall be final unless appeal be taken to the superintendent

24 Kevin J. Fandl, Immigration Posses: US Immigration Law and Local Enforcement
Practices, 34 J Legis 16, 18 (2008).
25 Henry S. Cohn and Harvey Gee, “No, No, No, No!”: Three Sons of Connecticut Who
Opposed the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 3 Conn Pub Int L J 1, 57 (2003).
26 Chae Chan Ping v United States, 130 US 581, 595–607 (1889).
27 Act of Aug 18, 1894, ch 301, 28 Stat 390.
28 Lem Moon Sing v United States, 158 US 538, 547–50 (1895):

The power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether from the United States, or to
prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may come to this country,
and to have its declared policy in that regard enforced exclusively through executive officers, without judicial intervention, is settled by our previous adjudications.
29 Weissbrodt, Immigration Law and Procedure at 7 (cited in note 18). See also John
Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925 68–106
(Rutgers 2002).
30 26 Stat 1084.
31 Immigration Act of 1891 § 7, 26 Stat at 1085.
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of immigration, whose action shall be subject to review by the Secretary of the Treasury.”32
Over the next thirty years, piecemeal legislation continued to
restrict the classes of noncitizens that could immigrate to the
United States and the level of judicial review that deported individuals could seek.33 The Immigration Act of 191734 stated that
“[i]n every case where any person is ordered deported from the
United States under the provisions of this Act, or of any law or
treaty, the decision of the Secretary of Labor shall be final.”35
The end of World War I marked a turning point for US immigration policy.36 After the war, the United States adopted an isolationist policy to protect its own labor force from an influx of immigrants from postwar Europe.37 Technological advances allowed
the economy to depend on mass industrialization, rather than
mass immigration.38 The Emergency Quota Act of 192139 placed a
limit on the number of people who could immigrate to the United
States.40
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 195241 (INA of 1952)
consolidated earlier legislation into one law and still serves as the
basis for federal immigration law.42 This Act retained the national
origins quota, kept the “quality control” exclusions found in earlier
legislation, stiffened the requirements for naturalized citizenship, and codified new conditions for relief from deportation and
suspension of deportation.43
Advocates of a more liberal immigration policy began to
emerge in the early 1950s, but they were unable to stop the passage of the INA of 1952. With the help of interest groups and a
growing support for the Civil Rights movement, Congress passed
32 Immigration Act of 1891 § 8, 26 Stat at 1085. The Supreme Court held this provision to be constitutional in Ekiu v United States, 142 US 651, 660 (1892).
33 See Weissbrodt, Immigration Law and Procedure at 8–9 (cited in note 18).
34 Act of Feb 5, 1917, 39 Stat 874.
35 Immigration Act of 1917 § 19, 39 Stat at 890. The Supreme Court upheld this provision in Heikkila v Barber, 345 US 229, 233–37 (1953) (explaining that “limitations on
judicial review of deportation must be followed ‘despite [their] apparent inconvenience to
the alien’”).
36 See Higham, Strangers in the Land at 300–24 (cited in note 29).
37 Weissbrodt, Immigration Law and Procedure at 11 (cited in note 18).
38 Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America
19 (Princeton 2014).
39 42 Stat 5.
40 Emergency Quota Act of 1921 ch 8, 42 Stat at 5.
41 66 Stat 163 (1952), codified as amended at 8 USC § 1101 et seq.
42 Fandl, 34 J Legis at 19 (cited in note 24).
43 See Ngai, Impossible Subjects at 237–39 (cited in note 38).
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the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA of 1965), marking a dramatic break from past immigration policy.44
B.

The Modern Framework: The Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1965 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act

The INA of 1965 established the modern framework for US
immigration law. It amended the INA of 1952 by loosening the
previous quota system, giving prospective immigrants from every
corner of the world a nearly equal shot at immigrating to the
United States.45
The INA of 1965 focused on reforming the process for legal
immigration. By the mid-1990s, Congress wished to reform procedures relating to illegal immigration, which had gone largely
unchanged since 1952. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),
which amended the INA of 1965 to
improve deterrence of illegal immigration to the United
States by increasing border patrol and investigative personnel, by increasing penalties for alien smuggling and for document fraud, by reforming exclusion and deportation law and
procedures, by improving the verification system for the eligibility for employment, and through other measures, to reform the legal immigration system and facilitate legal entries
into the United States, and for other purposes.46
Among other things, the IIRIRA provides for expedited removal
proceedings,47 consolidated deportation and exclusion proceedings,48 and expanded categories of inadmissible aliens.49 Some legislative history suggests that Congress intended the IIRIRA to
“strengthen the border enforcement by nearly doubling the size of
the Border Patrol” and to “ensure that aliens who commit serious
crimes are detained upon their release from prison until they can
44

See id at 239–48.
Dave McGurdy, The Future of US Immigration Law, 20 J Legis 3, 5 (1994). The
INA maintained limits on the number of immigrants who could come to the United States,
but it eliminated national origin, race, and ancestry as a basis for immigration. It also
significantly increased the ceiling for non–Western European countries. Id.
46 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 Conference
Report, HR Rep No 104-828, 104th Cong, 2d Sess 1 (1996).
47 8 USC § 1225.
48 8 USC § 1229a.
49 8 USC § 1182.
45

2019]

8 USC § 1252(g) and Wrongfully Removed Noncitizens

1663

be deported, and then they will be deported under expedited
procedures.”50
Before Congress enacted the IIRIRA, courts lacked jurisdiction to review the deportation orders of noncitizens who had already been removed from the United States.51 Accordingly, a
noncitizen who appealed a removal order was typically entitled to
remain in the United States, pending judicial review.52 To facilitate prompt removal, the IIRIRA adjusted these provisions in
three ways: First, Congress allowed for review once a noncitizen
had been deported.53 Second, Congress repealed the presumption
of an automatic stay.54 Finally, the IIRIRA restricted the availability of injunctive relief.55 Taken together, these changes mean
that a noncitizen asserting a claim arising from their removal is
not entitled to remain in the United States while the suit is
pending.
C.

Section 1252(g)

Before the IIRIRA was enacted, removal orders were treated
like other agency actions and were appealable under 28 USC
§ 2342.56 The IIRIRA repealed the old judicial-review scheme and
replaced it with § 1252(g), which restricts judicial review of the
Attorney General’s “decision or action” to “commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter” unless an exception applies.57 The full text of
§ 1252(g) states:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any
other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including
section 2241 of title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision,
and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall have
jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any
50 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 104th
Cong, 2d Sess, in 142 Cong Rec S10572 (daily ed Sept 16, 1996) (IIRIRA Record) (statement of Sen Simpson).
51 See 8 USC § 1105a(c) (1994) (“An order of deportation or of exclusion shall not be
reviewed by any court . . . if [the noncitizen] has departed from the United States after the
issuance of the order.”).
52 See 8 USC § 1105a(a)(3) (1994) (“The service of the petition for review . . . shall
stay the deportation of the alien pending determination of the petition by the court, unless
the court otherwise directs.”).
53 See IIRIRA § 306, 110 Stat 3009-612 (repealing § 1105a).
54 8 USC § 1252(b)(3)(B).
55 8 USC § 1252(f).
56 See 8 USC § 1105a (1994), repealed by IIRIRA § 306(b), 110 Stat 3009.
57 8 USC § 1252(g).
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alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute
removal orders against any alien under this chapter.58
The legislative history of the IIRIRA indicates that Congress
intended the IIRIRA’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions to make it
easier to remove deportable noncitizens. Section 1252(g)’s purpose was “to streamline removal proceedings and enhance enforcement of immigration laws that had gone largely unchanged
since 1952.”59 The Act’s Senate Report further provides that the
judicial review provisions were intended to “expedit[e] the removal of excludable and deportable aliens.”60
Section 1252(g) was not included in the IIRIRA without opposition. Congressman Jerrold Nadler cautioned, “The bill eliminates judicial review for most [Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS)] actions. Just think, a Federal bureaucracy with no
judicial accountability. . . . No government agency should be allowed to act, much less lock people up or send them back to dictatorships, without being subject to court review.”61
Perhaps Congressman Nadler was right. On its face,
§ 1252(g) appears very broad. It seemingly abolishes judicial review of almost every challenge a noncitizen can make to her detention or removal. Congress also plainly intended to expedite removal proceedings of noncitizens.
But the rest of the legislative history makes clear that the
majority of members of Congress did not intend for this provision
to be infinitely broad, and it is unlikely that wrongful removal
was even considered when enacting the statute.62 In congressional
testimony, the INS General Counsel remarked that “[t]he Administration is committed to ensuring that aliens in deportation
proceedings are afforded appropriate due process; however, the
58

8 USC § 1252(g). See also note 3.
Patricia Flynn and Judith Patterson, Five Years Later: Fifth Circuit Case Law Developments under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 53
Baylor L Rev 557, 561 (2001). See also Immigration in the National Interest Act of 1995,
HR Rep No 104-469(1), 104th Cong, 2d Sess 365–67 (1996).
60 S Rep No 104-249, 104th Cong, 2d Sess at 2 (1996).
61 Conference Report on HR 2202, Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, in 142 Cong Rec H11085 (daily ed Sept 25, 1996) (statement of Rep Nadler).
62 See Immigration and Naturalization Service v St. Cyr, 533 US 289, 314 (2001).
The Court held that Congress did not clearly intend for § 1252 to preclude judicial consideration of habeas claims. This is one example of a limit on § 1252’s seemingly broad scope,
which illustrates that it was not intended to abolish judicial review of every challenge a
noncitizen could make. For additional support that § 1252 (g) was intended to contain limits, see Reno v American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 US 471, 482 (1999).
59
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availability of multiple layers of judicial review has frustrated the
timely removal of deportable aliens.”63 According to one senator,
the bill would “create an expedited removal process, so that those
who seek to enter the United States surreptitiously or with fraudulent documents can be promptly deported and not allowed to stay
here for years while pursuing various frivolous appeals.”64 Consequently, it is unlikely that Congress intended for § 1252(g) to preclude the exercise of federal jurisdiction in cases in which the removal violates a court order, a statute, or a government regulation
because those cases do not contain “deportable” noncitizens or
“frivolous” appeals. Additionally, the plaintiffs in these cases tend
to seek damages rather than a prolongation of their stay in the
United States, so allowing these suits will not frustrate the
IIRIRA’s goal of expedient removal.65
***
US immigration policy was most restrictive in the early twentieth century. Modern immigration law retreats from that isolationism, but immigration is still heavily restrictive—especially
for those facing removal. When Congress passed the IIRIRA in
1996, it intended to expedite the removal process and limit frivolous appeals. This is clear in § 1252(g), which restricts judicial review of a noncitizen’s claims “arising from the decision or action
by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate
cases, or execute removal orders.”
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE SCOPE OF § 1252(G)
Courts have struggled to define the scope of 8 USC § 1252(g).
As Congressman Nadler suggested, the statute seems infinitely
broad—noncitizens cannot sue for claims arising from any decision or action to remove them. But the provision’s legislative history makes clear that it was not meant to be all-encompassing,
and courts have had trouble identifying a limiting principle.

63 Removal of Criminal and Illegal Aliens, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong, 1st Sess 15
(1995) (statement of T. Alexander Aleinikoff, General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service).
64 IIRIRA Record, 142 Cong Rec at S10572 (statement of Sen Simpson) (emphasis
added) (cited in note 50).
65 See, for example, Arce, 899 F3d at 799; Silva, 866 F3d at 939. In both of these
cases the plaintiffs sought damages rather than a prolongation of their stay in the United
States.
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The circuit courts are split as to how § 1252(g) should be interpreted. This can have major implications for noncitizens. For
example, noncitizens separated from their jobs and families by
wrongful deportations can recover damages if they live in Oregon
but not if they live in Iowa. As a general matter, some circuits
interpret § 1252(g) broadly and others interpret it narrowly. But
the split is deeper than that—even circuits that agree about how
the statute should be interpreted disagree about why. This Part
separates the discussion of the circuit split into two sections based
on the reasoning and justifications relied upon by the circuits.
The first Section discusses circuits that focus on the issue of
wrongful removal, and the second examines circuits that emphasize the issue of discretionary authority.66
A.

Circuits That Primarily Analyze Wrongful Removal

The Eighth and Ninth Circuits agree that the focus when interpreting § 1252(g) should be on whether the statute applies to
wrongful removal suits. But the two disagree about the outcome.
The Eighth Circuit holds that § 1252(g) precludes the exercise of
federal jurisdiction when a noncitizen is wrongfully removed from
the United States,67 and the Ninth Circuit holds the opposite.68
The phrase “wrongful removal” has a narrow, particular
meaning. It refers only to situations in which an individual is removed in violation of a court order, a statute, or a federal regulation. It does not matter whether the removal was intentionally
wrongful. The most typical wrongful removal case involves the
government deporting someone after a court has issued a stay of
removal. This may happen uncomfortably often because 8 CFR
§ 1003.6(a) grants noncitizens an automatic stay of removal when
they file a timely appeal against an immigration judge’s decision.69

66 This circuit split overlaps in part with the wrongful removal split. The Ninth Circuit in Arce, for example, stated that “even if we agreed with the government that [the
plaintiff’s] claims tangentially ‘arise from’ the execution of his removal order, we would
still retain jurisdiction because the Attorney General entirely lacked the authority, and
therefore the discretion, to remove him.” Arce, 899 F3d at 800. The discretionary authority
split is broader, however, because it encompasses cases that do not involve wrongful removal. See, for example, Mustata v Jenifer, 179 F3d 1017, 1018 (6th Cir 1999) (dealing
with an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). It is also narrower because the legal analysis
is confined to whether § 1252(g) requires discretionary action.
67 See Silva, 866 F3d at 939.
68 See Arce, 899 F3d at 798.
69 8 CFR § 1003.6(a).
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1. The Eighth Circuit held in Silva that § 1252(g) applies
to wrongful removal suits.
Silva involved a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim
brought by a noncitizen who was wrongfully removed from the
United States after being convicted of two criminal offenses in
Minnesota.70 After the government initiated removal proceedings,
the plaintiff filed a timely appeal with the Board of Immigration
Appeals. This appeal automatically stayed the execution of a removal order,71 but the government ignored the stay and removed
the plaintiff to Mexico.72 In response, the plaintiff sued under the
FTCA, but the district court dismissed the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under § 1252(g).73
The Eighth Circuit held that § 1252(g) precludes the exercise
of federal jurisdiction when a noncitizen is wrongfully removed
from the United States.74 The court reasoned that, “[a]lthough the
execution of this removal order happened to be in violation of a
stay, the alien’s claims are directly connected to the execution of
the removal order.”75 According to the court, the removal order
“still existed” despite the stay, thereby connecting the plaintiff’s
FTCA claim “directly and immediately” to the decision to execute
the order.76 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit disagreed with the
plaintiff’s argument that his claims arose from a violation of the
stay of removal proceedings rather than from “a decision or action
to execute a removal order” as required by § 1252(g).77
Sharply dissenting from the majority opinion, Judge Jane
Kelly argued that § 1252(g) is “much narrower” than the majority
held it to be.78 She emphasized that § 1252(g) only strips federal
courts of jurisdiction over claims arising from three discrete “decision[s] or action[s]” that the Attorney General may take: “to
‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’”79 Reasoning that the court’s stay “divested the government
of its authority to remove [the plaintiff],” Judge Kelly concluded
the plaintiff’s claims could not “be fairly characterized as ‘arising
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Silva, 866 F3d at 939.
Id, citing 8 CFR § 1003.6(a).
Silva, 866 F3d at 939.
Id.
Id.
Id at 940.
Silva, 866 F3d at 940.
Id.
Id at 942 (Kelly dissenting).
Id, quoting 8 USC § 1252(g).
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from’ the government’s decision or action to execute a removal order.”80 As such, she concluded that § 1252(g) should not preclude
the exercise of federal jurisdiction over a wrongfully removed
noncitizen’s claims.81
2. The Ninth Circuit held in Arce that § 1252(g) does not
apply to wrongful removal suits.
The facts in Arce are similar to those presented in Silva. US
Border Patrol apprehended the plaintiff, a Mexican citizen, and
transferred him to a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) detention facility.82 An asylum officer found that the plaintiff did not
have a reasonable fear of persecution83 and an immigration judge
ordered his removal after affirming this finding. The plaintiff
filed for a petition of review and stay of removal, which the Ninth
Circuit granted.84 DHS proceeded to remove the plaintiff in direct
violation of the stay.85 In turn, the plaintiff sued under the FTCA,
but the district court dismissed the complaint on the belief that
§ 1252(g) deprived it of jurisdiction.86
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that “§ 1252(g) does not
strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over claims challenging . . .
[a] decision or action to violate a court order staying removal.”87
According to the court, the plaintiff’s claims arose “not from the
execution of the removal order, but from the violation of [the]
court’s order” to stay the removal proceedings.88 Furthermore, it
reasoned that the Secretary of DHS lacked the authority, and
therefore the discretion, to remove the plaintiff.89 The court held
that “[w]here the Attorney General totally lacks the discretion to
effectuate a removal order, § 1252(g) is simply not implicated.”90

80

Silva, 866 F3d at 942 (Kelly dissenting).
Id.
82 Arce, 899 F3d at 798.
83 This is required for the plaintiff to be granted asylum. See 8 CFR § 208.31 (“The
alien shall be determined to have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture if the alien
establishes a reasonable possibility that he or she would be persecuted on account of
his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion.”).
84 Arce, 899 F3d at 799.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id at 800.
88 Arce, 899 F3d at 800.
89 Id.
90 Id at 801.
81
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The Ninth Circuit reasoned that its interpretation was “supported by the express instructions of the Supreme Court, [the
Ninth Circuit’s] precedent, and common sense, all of which require[d] [it] to read the statute narrowly.”91 It reasoned that the
Supreme Court’s precedent dictates a narrow reading of § 1252(g)
and that “[t]he Supreme Court has not ‘interpret[ed] [the statute’s]
language to sweep in any claim that can technically be said to
‘arise from’ the three listed actions of the Attorney General.”92
B.

Circuits That Primarily Analyze Discretionary Authority

While the Eighth and Ninth Circuits focus on the issue of
wrongful removal, other circuits analyze the scope of § 1252(g) by
focusing on whether the statute applies only to the Attorney General’s discretionary decisions. If so, then suits stemming from
wrongful removal will not be precluded from judicial review because government officials never have the discretion to violate
statutes, court orders, or the Constitution.93 The Third, Sixth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that § 1252(g) applies only to
discretionary decisions. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits hold the
opposite.94
The difference between this approach and the wrongful removal approach can have significant consequences for noncitizens. Because wrongful removal is a narrower limiting principle
than discretionary authority,95 fewer cases will proceed in jurisdictions that exclusively embrace wrongful removal. A noncitizen

91

Id at 800.
Arce, 899 F3d at 800, quoting Jennings v Rodriguez, 138 S Ct 830, 841 (2018) (alterations in original) (holding that 8 USC § 1252(b)(9) does not strip courts of jurisdiction
to hear a noncitizen’s challenge to the constitutionality of prolonged detention in the absence of periodic bond hearings). The Jennings Court held that even though the case technically arose from the Attorney General’s decision to execute a removal order, § 1252(b)(9)
should be interpreted narrowly because otherwise it makes claims of prolonged detention
effectively unreviewable. Jennings, 138 S Ct at 840.
93 See Myers & Myers, Inc v United States Postal Service, 527 F2d 1252, 1261 (2d Cir
1975) (“It is, of course, a tautology that a federal official cannot have discretion to behave
unconstitutionally or outside the scope of his delegated authority.”), citing Larson v Domestic
& Foreign Commerce Corp, 337 US 682, 689–90 (1949). See also Nurse v United States,
226 F3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir 2000) (“In general, governmental conduct cannot be discretionary if it violates a legal mandate.”).
94 Note that Arce and Silva discuss both wrongful removal and discretionary authority. The other circuits discussed in this Section only address the issue of discretionary
authority.
95 This is because all wrongful removal cases can be seen as discretionary authority
cases, but not all discretionary authority cases can be seen as wrongful removal cases.
92
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claiming to have received ineffective assistance of counsel in a deportation proceeding, for example, can appeal in a discretionary
authority jurisdiction, but not a wrongful removal jurisdiction.96
1. The Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that
§ 1252(g) applies only to discretionary decisions.
Four circuits hold that § 1252(g) applies only to the Attorney
General’s discretionary decisions. These circuits tend to ground
their reasoning in Reno v American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee,97 in which the Court stated that § 1252(g) “applies
only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take:
her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate
cases, or execute removal orders.’” 98
The Third Circuit was the first to hold that § 1252(g) does not
apply to cases in which the Attorney General acts without discretion. According to the court, § 1252(g)’s jurisdictional bar does not
apply when the petitioner “is not challenging the discretionary
decision to commence proceedings, but is challenging the government’s very authority to commence those proceedings.”99 This distinction is subtle, and the court did not elaborate on it. Essentially,
the court reasoned that a noncitizen removed in violation of a stay
is not challenging a “decision or action” to execute removal orders—
rather, the noncitizen is arguing that the Attorney General did not
even have the authority to execute the removal order.100 The

96 See Madu v Attorney General of the United States, 470 F3d 1362, 1367–68 (11th
Cir 2006).
97 525 US 471 (1999).
98 Id at 482 (emphasis omitted).
99 Garcia v Attorney General, 533 F3d 724, 729 (3d Cir 2009) (emphasis in original).
100 See id at 728–29.
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Ninth,101 Eleventh,102 and Sixth103 Circuits have since joined in
that reasoning.
2. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits hold § 1252(g) does not
distinguish between discretionary and nondiscretionary
decisions.
In contrast, the Fifth and Eighth Circuit hold that § 1252(g)
is not restricted to the Attorney General’s discretionary decisions.
These two circuits reason that a strictly textualist interpretation
of § 1252(g) does not differentiate between discretionary and nondiscretionary action. The Fifth Circuit, for example, directly addressed whether § 1252(g) “requires that judicial review be precluded only when the Attorney General makes discretionary
decisions.”104 Rejecting an argument in the affirmative, the court
held that “[a]lthough the [Supreme] Court emphasized the importance of preserving the Attorney General’s discretionary functions in the three enumerated categories, it did not explicitly state
that the provision applies only to review of discretionary decisions
by the Attorney General in these areas and not to review of nondiscretionary decisions.”105 The court further noted that Supreme
Court precedent contains “no discussion of review over nondiscretionary actions” and that “a plain reading of the statute

101 The Ninth Circuit held in Catholic Social Services, Inc v Immigration and Naturalization Service, 232 F3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir 2000) (en banc), that § 1252(g) “applies
only to the three specific discretionary actions mentioned in its text, not to all claims relating in any way to deportation proceedings.” This was reaffirmed in Arce, in which the
court held that § 1252(g) is limited “to actions challenging the Attorney General’s discretionary decisions to initiate proceedings, adjudicate cases, and execute removal orders.”
Arce, 899 F3d at 800.
102 In Madu, the Eleventh Circuit held that § 1252(g) does not strip the court of jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to detention and impending removal. Madu, 470
F3d at 1363. The plaintiff had filed a habeas petition challenging his detention and removal on the grounds that he had left the United States by the deadline set forth in the
immigration judge’s voluntary departure order. The court reasoned that while § 1252(g)
“bars courts from reviewing certain exercises of discretion by the attorney general, it does
not proscribe substantive review of the underlying legal bases for those discretionary decisions and actions.” Id at 1368.
103 The Sixth Circuit reasoned in Mustata that § 1252(g) does not bar review of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim because “[the petitioners] are not asking the Attorney General to exercise her discretion to allow them to remain in the United States.” Mustata,
179 F3d at 1022–23.
104 Foster, 243 F3d at 214.
105 Id, citing American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 US at 486 (emphasis added).
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demonstrates that Congress did not exclude nondiscretionary decisions from this provision limiting judicial review.”106 The Eighth
Circuit has adopted substantially similar reasoning.107
III. WRONGFUL REMOVAL IS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF § 1252(g)
Part II established that circuit courts disagree about how to
interpret § 1252(g). The Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits disagree with the Fifth and Eighth Circuits about whether
§ 1252(g) applies only to the Attorney General’s discretionary decisions. Similarly, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits disagree about
whether § 1252(g) applies to wrongful removal suits. There is
some overlap between these embedded circuit splits, but the takeaway is clear—there is no prevailing interpretation of the statute.
Resolution of this question would have significant consequences. Hundreds of thousands of noncitizens are removed each
year.108 The deportation process can take several years, families
may be separated, and detainees may be treated like prisoners.109
The current state of the law arbitrarily conditions relief on which
federal jurisdiction the noncitizen was removed from.
This Part advances four discrete arguments for why § 1252(g)
should be interpreted narrowly to allow federal jurisdiction when,
in the context of a challenge to removal, the government violates
a court order, a statute, or its own regulations. First, the Supreme
Court has suggested that § 1252(g) may apply only to the Attorney General’s discretionary decisions, and wrongful removal is
never in the Attorney General’s discretion. Second, Supreme
Court precedent and the legislative history of § 1252(g) counsel in
favor of a narrow interpretation of the phrase “arising from” in
§ 1252(g). Third, wrongful removal might not be covered by
§ 1252(g) because it is not a “decision or action . . . [to] execute
removal orders.”110 Finally, several policy considerations push in
favor of a narrow interpretation. Specifically, a narrow
interpretation would restrain the executive and prevent harm to
106 Foster, 243 F3d at 214. Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Foster does not
engage in any way with Catholic Social Services, despite being decided only a year apart
and Catholic Social Services being decided en banc.
107 See Silva, 866 F3d at 940–42 (“The statute [ ] makes no distinction between discretionary and nondiscretionary decisions. So long as the claim arises from a decision to
execute a removal order, there is no jurisdiction.”).
108 US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Fiscal Year 2018 at *10 (cited in
note 11).
109 See notes 13–15.
110 See 8 USC § 1252(g).
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noncitizens. Taken together, these arguments strongly suggest
that § 1252(g) should be interpreted narrowly to allow federal jurisdiction over wrongful removal cases.
A.

Supreme Court Precedent Suggests That § 1252(g) May Be
Confined to the Attorney General’s Discretionary Decisions

In this Section, I argue that Supreme Court precedent weighs
in favor of confining § 1252(g) to cases involving the Attorney
General’s discretionary decisions. While this potentially resolves
the circuit splits described in Part II, it ultimately rests on ambiguity in Supreme Court case law. Relying on wrongful removal as
the limiting principle to § 1252(g), I suggest below, has a much
stronger legal foundation and addresses concerns articulated by
the circuit courts on both sides of the split.
In American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the Supreme Court suggested that the scope of § 1252(g) may be confined to discretionary decisions, even though the face of the statute does not impose such a requirement.111 Throughout the
opinion, the Court repeatedly characterized § 1252(g) and the
IIRIRA as specifically protecting the Attorney General’s discretionary decisions. That specificity suggests that § 1252(g) might
not apply to the Attorney General’s nondiscretionary decisions.
For example, according to the Court, § 1252(g) “seems clearly designed to give some measure of protection to . . . discretionary determinations.”112 The Court continued, “[M]any provisions of
IIRIRA are aimed at protecting the Executive’s discretion from
the courts—indeed, that can fairly be said to be the theme of the
legislation.”113 After considering the statute’s purpose and legislative history, the Court declared that “Section 1252(g) was directed against a particular evil: attempts to impose judicial constraints upon prosecutorial discretion.”114
The Court repeatedly characterized § 1252(g) as “narrow.”115
It explained that “[t]he provision applies only to three discrete
actions that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” 116 The Court cited various examples of decisions
111
112
113
114
115
116

525 US at 487.
Id at 485 (emphasis in original).
Id at 486 (emphasis omitted).
Id at 485 n 9.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 US at 482, 487.
Id at 482 (emphasis in original).
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or actions that are part of the deportation process but are nonetheless reviewable, including decisions to open investigations,
surveil suspected violators, and reschedule deportation hearings.117 Despite repeatedly emphasizing the narrowness of
§ 1252(g), the Court did not explicitly state whether the statute is
limited to the Attorney General’s discretionary decisions. Without
additional Supreme Court guidance, it is unlikely that the circuit
split on this issue will be resolved.
A possible solution is for courts to embrace wrongful removal,
rather than discretionary authority, as the limiting principle to
§ 1252(g)’s scope. As discussed below, the wrongful removal limiting principle has a strong legal foundation in Supreme Court
precedent, legislative history, and public policy.
B.

The Scope of Capacious Language like “Arising From”
Should Be Informed by Legislative History and Common
Sense

In this Section, I argue that Supreme Court precedent
strongly suggests that § 1252(g) should be interpreted narrowly
to not apply to cases involving wrongful removal. Section 1252(g)
applies only to cases “arising from” the Attorney General’s decision or action to remove someone from the United States.118 I identify two principles from seven modern Supreme Court cases119 deciding the scope of capacious language like “arising from,” “in
connection with,” “related to,” or “affecting.” First, the scope of
statutory language should be informed by the statute’s purpose
and legislative history. Second, courts should avoid reading statutes with an “uncritical literalism” that will lead to results that
“no sensible person could have intended.”120 As discussed below,
these two rules guide this Comment’s principal argument—that
“arising from” in § 1252(g) should be interpreted narrowly.
117

See id at 482.
8 USC § 1252(g).
119 See generally Jennings, 138 S Ct 830; Gobeille v Liberty Mutual Insurance Co, 136
S Ct 936 (2016); Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v Electric Power Supply Association,
136 S Ct 760 (2016); Maracich v Spears, 570 US 48 (2013); Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc v
Pelkey, 569 US 251 (2013); New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans
v Travelers Insurance Co, 514 US 645 (1995); Celotex Corp v Edwards, 514 US 300 (1995).
To the best of my knowledge, no other modern Supreme Court case analyzes the scope of
“capacious language” as one of its primary holdings. Jennings decided the issue as a
threshold question, and the other six cases decided the issue as their primary holdings.
Furthermore, I could find no Supreme Court case that stands contrary to the two principles I distill from these cases.
120 Jennings, 138 S Ct at 840, citing Gobeille, 136 S Ct at 943.
118

2019]

8 USC § 1252(g) and Wrongfully Removed Noncitizens

1675

With these two principles in mind, this Section proceeds in
four subsections. The first analyzes Jennings v Rodriguez,121 in
which the Court interpreted the phrase “arising from” in a neighboring provision—8 USC § 1252(b)(9)—of the INA narrowly.122
The second describes four other cases in which the Court interpreted other capacious language narrowly. The third describes two
cases in which the Court interpreted such language broadly. Even
though these cases reach opposite conclusions, they demonstrate
how the two principles identified above determine how broadly
the statute should be read. The fourth Section applies the legal
rules synthesized in Parts III.B.1–3 to conclude that the phrase
“arising from” in § 1252(g) should be interpreted narrowly.
1. The Court held in Jennings that the phrase “arising
from” in § 1252(b)(9) should be interpreted narrowly.
The plaintiff in Jennings—a Mexican citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States—sought relief after being
detained for more than six months without a bond hearing during
an immigration proceeding.123 Before reaching the primary issue—whether detained noncitizens have a right to periodic bond
hearings—the Court first analyzed the threshold question of
whether § 1252(b)(9) deprived it of jurisdiction.124 Section 1252(b)(9) states that “[j]udicial review of all questions of law
and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought
to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter
shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under
this section.”125
A plurality of the Court held that § 1252(b)(9) did not deprive
it of jurisdiction, even though that holding conflicts with the literal reading of the statute. It admitted that “if those actions [to
remove the plaintiffs from the United States] had never been
taken, the aliens would not be in custody at all.”126 Nonetheless,
the Court held that “when confronted with capacious phrases like

121

138 S Ct 830 (2018).
Jennings is discussed in its own Section because it is the Court’s most recent decision on “capacious language” and it deals with the phrase “arising from” in § 1252 of the
INA. The other cases all support the legal rules drawn from Jennings.
123 Jennings, 138 S Ct at 838–40.
124 Id at 839.
125 8 USC § 1252(b)(9).
126 Jennings, 138 S Ct at 840.
122

1676

The University of Chicago Law Review

[86:1655

‘arising from,’ we have eschewed ‘uncritical literalism’ leading to
results that ‘no sensible person could have intended.’” 127
The court gave several examples of situations in which federal courts would retain jurisdiction even though the operative
“questions of law and fact” could be said to “aris[e] from” actions
taken to remove the noncitizens. First, “[s]uppose, for example,
that a detained alien wishes to assert a claim under Bivens. . .
based on allegedly inhumane conditions of confinement.”128 Second, “suppose that a detained alien brings a state-law claim for
assault against a guard or fellow detainee.”129 Finally, “suppose
that an alien is injured when a truck hits the bus transporting
aliens to a detention facility, and the alien sues the driver or
owner of the truck.”130 In each of these cases the court explained
that it “would be absurd” to “cram[ ] judicial review of [these]
questions into the review of final removal orders.”131
Although he concurred with the case’s disposition, Justice
Clarence Thomas disagreed with the plurality’s holding. He reasoned that the words “arising from,” even when read narrowly,
covered the claims at issue in the case “because detention is an
‘action taken . . . to remove’ an alien.”132 Justice Thomas addressed the plurality’s argument that a broad reading of “arising
from” would lead to “staggering results”—describing the three examples given by the plurality—by claiming that “those actions are
neither congressionally authorized nor meant to ensure that an
alien can be removed.”133 He thus drew a distinction between challenging the fact of detention, “an action taken in pursuit of the
lawful objective of removal,” and claims about injuries suffered
during detention, “actions that go beyond the Government’s lawful pursuit of its removal objective.”134
Justice Thomas’s reasoning is consistent with holding that
§ 1252(g) does not apply to cases involving wrongful removal. In
instances in which the government violates a statute, a court order, or its own regulation, deportation is not “an action taken in
pursuit of the lawful objective of removal.”135 Suits stemming from
127

Id at 840 (emphasis added), citing Gobeille, 136 S Ct at 943.
Jennings, 138 S Ct at 840 (citation omitted).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Jennings, 138 S Ct at 855 (Thomas concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in original).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id (emphasis added).
128
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wrongful removal also tend to be damages actions in response to
the government’s violation of a court order, rather than a challenge to the fact of removal. For example, the plaintiffs in both
Silva and Arce asserted FTCA claims for damages against the
government, rather than challenging the fact of their removal.136
Jennings was decided in early 2018, so only the Ninth Circuit
had the opportunity to address it in its opinion.137 In Arce, the
Ninth Circuit stated that its interpretation was supported by the
Supreme Court’s “express instructions” that § 1252(g) does not
“sweep in any claim that can technically be said to ‘arise from’ the
three listed actions of the Attorney General.”138 This language was
derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee,139 which the Eighth Circuit distinguished in Silva.140
2. Supreme Court cases in which capacious language is
read narrowly.
In addition to Jennings, there are four modern cases141 in
which the Court has interpreted similarly capacious language
narrowly. These cases stand for the same two principles: the scope
of statutory language should be informed by the statute’s purpose
and legislative history, and courts should avoid reading statutes
with an “uncritical literalism” that will lead to results that “no
sensible person could have intended.”142 When considering legislative history and purpose, courts ask whether the conduct allegedly covered by the statute undermines Congress’s objective in
enacting that statute. If so, then the statute’s “capacious language” should not be interpreted to cover the challenged conduct.
Similarly, reading capacious language sensibly requires courts to
find some logical limit to the statute’s scope. Such language

136

See Arce, 899 F3d at 799; Silva, 866 F3d at 939.
Silva was decided on August 9, 2017, Jennings was decided on February 27, 2018,
and Arce was decided on August 9, 2018.
138 Arce, 899 F3d at 800 (referring to the Court’s statement in Jennings).
139 See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 US at 482 (“[Section 1252(g)] applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take:
her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders.’”).
140 Silva, 866 F3d at 941 (“But this reference to discretionary decisions [in AmericanArab Anti-Discrimination Committee] did not say that § 1252(g) applies only to discretionary decisions, notwithstanding plain language that includes no such limitation.”).
141 See note 119 (explaining my selection methodology).
142 Jennings, 138 S Ct at 840, citing Gobeille, 136 S Ct at 943.
137
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should not be interpreted limitlessly, and the court’s interpretation of it should not be so broad that it cannot “be attributed to a
rational Congress.”143 That said, defining the scope of capacious
language is necessarily a case-by-case inquiry that depends on
the statute’s specific language, Congress’s objective when enacting the provision in question, and the conduct allegedly covered
by the Act.
First is Maracich v Spears,144 in which the Court applied
these two principles to hold that the phrase “in connection with”
in the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act145 (DPPA) should be interpreted narrowly.146 The case involved a group of attorneys who
had used personal information obtained from the South Carolina
DMV to send solicitation letters to prospective clients.147 The
DPPA provided that such information may be disclosed “[f]or use
in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral
proceeding in any Federal, State, or local court.”148 The defendant
attorneys argued that the solicitation of potential clients was a
use “in connection with” litigation, so their actions were protected
by the DDPA.149
The DPPA’s legislative history supported a narrow interpretation. Congress enacted the DPPA to protect an individual’s
right to privacy in his or her motor vehicles.150 The Court reasoned, “If [§ 2721](b)(4) were read to permit disclosure of personal
information whenever any connection between the protected information and a potential legal dispute could be shown, it would
undermine in a substantial way the DPPA’s purpose.”151 Consequently, a broad interpretation of the statute would both undermine Congress’s objectives and would violate common sense.
Similarly, a “sensible interpretation” that eschews “uncritical
literalism” supported a narrow interpretation. The Court noted
that the DPPA’s “in connection with” language must have a limit,
and a “logical and necessary conclusion is that an attorney’s solicitation of prospective clients falls outside of that limit.”152 After
considering both these principles, the Court concluded that the
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

See Dan’s City Used Cars, 569 US at 265.
570 US 48 (2013).
Pub L No 103-322, 108 Stat 2099 (1994), codified at 18 USC § 2721 et seq.
Maracich, 570 US at 59–61.
Id at 51–53.
18 USC § 2721(b)(4).
Maracich, 570 US at 59.
Id at 60–61.
Id.
Id.
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“in connection with” language in the statute did not cover attorneys using DMV records to send solicitation letters to clients.153
The Court continued to apply these two principles—that the
scope of capacious language should be considered in light of the
statute’s legislative history and purpose, and that courts should
read capacious language sensibly—in Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc v
Pelkey.154 The plaintiff sued the defendant for violating state laws
governing the enforcement of statutory liens for towing fees after
the defendant towed the plaintiff’s car and sold it to a third
party.155 The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s claims were
preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization
Act of 1994156 (FAAAA), which preempted state laws “related to a
price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the
transportation of property.”157
The Court considered Congress’s objective in enacting the
statute, which was to displace “certain aspects of the State regulatory process” that “impeded the free flow of trade, traffic, and
transportation of interstate commerce.”158 It reasoned that claims
stemming from improperly towed vehicles did not relate to this
purpose.159 Furthermore, the Court refused to read the preemption clause with “uncritical literalism”—stating that “the breadth
of the words ‘related to’ does not mean the sky is the limit.”160 It
cautioned against an interpretation of the phrase “related to” that
is so broad that it cannot “be attributed to a rational Congress.”161
Considering these two principles in tandem, the Court concluded
that that the phrase “related to” does not include claims stemming from improperly towed vehicles.162
The third case is Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v
Electric Power Supply Association,163 in which the Court applied
the two principles to the Federal Power Act164 (FPA).165 The FPA
authorized the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
153

Maracich, 570 US at 78.
569 US 251 (2013).
155 Id at 251–52.
156 Pub L No 103-305, 108 Stat 1569, codified as amended in various sections of
Title 49.
157 49 USC § 14501(c)(1).
158 Dan’s City Used Cars, 569 US at 263 (emphasis in original).
159 Id at 263.
160 Id at 252, 260 (internal citations omitted).
161 Id at 265.
162 Dan’s City Used Cars, 569 US at 265.
163 136 S Ct 760 (2016).
164 41 Stat 1063 (1920), codified as amended at 16 USC § 791a et seq.
165 Electric Power Supply, 136 S Ct at 776.
154
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to regulate “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate
commerce,” including both wholesale electricity rates and any
rule or practice “affecting” such rates.166
The Court believed that a narrow reading of the statute was
consistent with congressional intent, stating, “We cannot imagine
that [FERC’s argument] was what Congress had in mind.”167 Focusing on the requirement that courts interpret capacious language sensibly, the Court stated that its holding was “a commonsense construction of the FPA’s language.”168 The Court reiterated, “As we have explained in addressing similar terms like ‘relating to’ or ‘in connection with,’ a non-hyperliteral reading is
needed to prevent the statute from assuming near-infinite
breadth.”169
Finally, the Court applied the same two principles in New
York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v Travelers Insurance Co170 to hold that the phrase “relate to” in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974171 (ERISA) should
be read narrowly.172 In the case, New York passed a statute that
required hospitals to charge patients covered by commercial insurers more than patients covered by a Blue Cross/Blue Shield
plan.173 The plaintiffs sued, claiming that § 514(a) of ERISA
preempted the state statute.174 Section 514(a) provides that
ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they . . .
relate to any employee benefit plan” covered by the statute.175
The Court held that the state statute does not “relate to” employee benefit plans and “accordingly suffer no pre-emption.”176 To
reach this holding, it looked to the purpose behind § 514(a). After
concluding that Congress’s intent behind the preemption provision

166 Id at 766, citing 16 USC §§ 824(b)(1), 824e(a). FERC issued an order requiring
market operators to pay demand response providers the same amount for conserving energy as they pay generators for producing it. The plaintiffs challenged the order as exceeding FERC’s authority to regulate “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate
commerce.” FERC argued that indirect or tangential impacts on wholesale electricity rates
sufficed to give it jurisdiction under the FPA. Electric Power Supply, 136 S Ct at 774.
167 Electric Power Supply, 136 S Ct at 774.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 514 US 645 (1995).
171 Pub L No 93-406, 88 Stat 829, codified as amended at 29 USC § 1001 et seq.
172 New York State Conference, 514 US at 649.
173 Id at 645.
174 Id.
175 29 USC § 1144(a).
176 New York State Conference, 514 US at 649.
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was “to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans,” the
Court adopted a narrow reading of the statute.177 Like in Jennings,
the majority eschewed an “uncritical literalism” that would require them to read the phrase “relate to” broadly.178 It stated that
“[i]f ‘relate to’ were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its
indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would
never run its course.”179
While Congress’s legislative purpose behind the statutes in
these four cases differed, the Court’s methodology for determining
the scope of the statutes’ capacious language was similar. First,
the Court considered Congress’s objective in enacting the statute.
Next, the Court asked whether the challenged conduct fell within
that purpose—and in each case it concluded that the challenged
conduct undermined Congress’s objective. Simultaneously, the
Court eschewed in each statute a literal interpretation that would
lead to results that “no sensible person could have intended.”180
These two factors led the court to interpret each of the four statutes narrowly.
3. Supreme Court cases in which capacious language is
read broadly.
There are at least two Supreme Court cases that have resulted in “capacious language” being interpreted broadly. These
cases should not be viewed as exceptions to the principles I have
outlined above—they both follow the same framework. These
cases come out differently because the legislative purpose and
history of the respective acts suggest that the pertinent capacious
language should cover the challenged conduct. In the cases discussed in the above Section, the conduct allegedly covered by the
Act undermined Congress’s purpose in enacting the statutes. But
in the two cases discussed here, the challenged conduct was consistent with Congress’s objectives. So while these cases come out
differently, they support my overall framework for how courts
should interpret the scope of capacious language: first, consider
Congress’s objective in enacting the statute, and then consider
how to read the statutory language sensibly.

177
178
179
180

Id at 645, 657.
See id at 656.
Id at 655.
Jennings, 138 S Ct at 840, citing Gobeille, 136 S Ct at 943.
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In Gobeille v Liberty Mutual Insurance Co,181 the Court dealt
with a similar issue as it did in New York State Conference but
came to the opposite conclusion—that the phrase “relate to” in
ERISA should be interpreted broadly enough to include the plaintiff’s claims.182 ERISA preempted “any and all State laws insofar
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan.”183 The plaintiff operated a self-insured employee health
plan. He sought a declaratory judgment that ERISA preempted a
Vermont statute requiring all health insurers to file certain disclosures with the state.184
In reaching its decision, the Court considered the breadth
that Congress intended to give ERISA’s preemption provision and
the importance of “reject[ing] ‘uncritical literalism’ in applying
the clause” so that the provision still has “workable standards.”185
The Court referenced New York State Conference and suggested
it was correctly decided.186 But then it reasoned that the two principles—considering Congress’s objective and sensible interpretation—as applied to Vermont’s disclosure requirement, suggested a
different outcome here. The Court noted that Congress intended
ERISA’s preemption clause to have a broad scope. Specifically,
ERISA was designed to preempt laws that “govern, or interfere with
the uniformity of, plan administration.”187 The Court found that it
was consistent with ERISA’s purpose to hold that the Vermont
statute was preempted.188 The Court found that its holding “ensure[s] that ERISA’s express preemption clause receives the
broad scope Congress intended while avoiding the clause’s susceptibility to limitless application.”189
Reaching a similar conclusion in Celotex Corp v Edwards,190
the Court interpreted the phrase “related to” in the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978191 broadly.192 The case concerned the scope of
bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction. A bankruptcy court had enjoined

181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

136 S Ct 936 (2016).
Id at 943.
29 USC § 1144(a).
Gobeille, 136 S Ct at 941–42.
Id at 943.
Id.
Id.
Gobeille, 136 S Ct at 943–45.
Id at 943.
514 US 300 (1995).
Pub L No 95-598, 92 Stat 2549, codified as amended at 11 USC § 101 et seq.
Celotex, 514 US at 308.
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respondents from executing on a supersedeas bond193 posted by
petitioner without the bankruptcy court’s permission.194 For the
bankruptcy court to have jurisdiction to decide whether the respondents were entitled to immediate execution on the bond, the proceeding must have been “related to” the petitioner’s bankruptcy.195
The Court first looked to Congress’s purpose and intention in
enacting the Bankruptcy Code. Even though “a proceeding by respondents against [the third party] on the supersedeas bond does
not directly involve [the petitioner], except to satisfy the judgment against it secured by the bond,” it was consistent with congressional intent to interpret the statute’s language broadly.196
The Court noted that “Congress intended to grant comprehensive
jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts so that they might deal efficiently and expeditiously with all matters connected with the
bankruptcy estate.”197 It went on to say that “a bankruptcy court’s
‘related to’ jurisdiction cannot be limitless,” but a broad reading
of the statute here was reasonable.198
Additionally, policy considerations support the Court’s holding in Celotex. Courts generally apply “a strong presumption in
favor of judicial review of administrative action.”199 When there is
an ambiguity in a jurisdiction-stripping statute, some courts hold
that it should be resolved in favor of the narrow interpretation.200
It was unclear whether the Bankruptcy Act intended to strip
bankruptcy courts of jurisdiction, so the Court may have been motivated in accordance with these principles to preserve judicial
review.
Even though Gobeille and Celotex resulted in a broad reading
of capacious language, the cases still apply the same interpretive
193 A supersedeas bond is a bond posted by an appellant in order to obtain a stay of
the district court’s judgement. If the appellant loses the appeal, the appellee is paid the
judgment plus any damages caused due to delay from the appeal. Bond (Merriam-Webster,
2018), archived at http://perma.cc/BE3M-QM9M.
194 Celotex, 514 US at 301–02.
195 Id at 307. The Bankruptcy Code states that “the district courts shall have original
but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or
related to cases under title 11,” 28 USC § 1334(b), and that district courts may refer “any
or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11 . . .
to the bankruptcy judges for the district.” 28 USC § 157(a).
196 Celotex, 514 US at 308–09.
197 Id at 308 (quotation marks omitted).
198 Id.
199 See, for example, Immigration and Naturalization Service v St. Cyr, 533 US 289,
298 (2001).
200 See, for example, ANA International Inc v Way, 393 F3d 886, 894 (9th Cir 2004);
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 US at 480–82.
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methodology as the cases in the preceding Section. The only difference is that the specific application of these principles to the
facts suggested a different outcome. With these principles in
mind, I turn to the next Section to apply them to the phrase “arising from” in § 1252(g).
4. Legislative history and Supreme Court precedent
support a narrow reading of § 1252(g).
The seven Supreme Court cases interpreting the scope of “capacious” statutory language like “arising from” each stand for the
same two rules: First, the scope of statutory language should be
informed by a statute’s purpose and legislative history. If the
challenged conduct undermines Congress’s objective in enacting
the statute, it is highly likely that the conduct should not be included under the statute’s capacious language. Second, courts
should avoid reading statutes with “uncritical literalism” such
that a strict reading of the statute will lead to results that “no
sensible person could have intended.”201 In every case identified
in this Section, the Court has agreed that capacious language
should not be read literally so as to cover every claim that could
tenuously be included under the capacious language. These two
rules, when applied to § 1252(g), strongly support a narrow reading of § 1252(g). This Section takes each rule in turn.
First, the IIRIRA’s purpose and legislative history suggest a
narrow reading of § 1252(g)’s jurisdiction-stripping provision.
Congress’s objective in enacting § 1252(g) was to expedite the removal process and to limit frivolous appeals, and neither of these
goals are undermined by allowing wrongful removal suits.202 Furthermore, a sensible interpretation of § 1252(g) will allow wrongful removal suits because the government should not be able to
violate a court order, a statute, or a regulation without an opportunity for judicial review.
According to a Senate Report, one of the major purposes of the
IIRIRA was to “create an expedited removal process, so that those
who seek to enter the United States surreptitiously or with fraudulent documents can be promptly deported and not allowed to stay
here for years while pursuing various frivolous appeals at all levels and in all forums, administrative and judicial.”203 Similarly,
201

Jennings, 138 S Ct at 840, citing Gobeille, 136 S Ct at 943.
For a discussion on the objectives of the IIRIRA, see Part I.B–C.
203 IIRIRA Record, 142 Cong Rec at S10572 (statement of Sen Simpson) (cited in
note 50).
202
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the Supreme Court stated in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee that § 1252(g) is “specifically directed at the deconstruction, fragmentation, and hence prolongation of removal proceedings.”204 But wrongful removal suits almost always take the
form of FTCA damages claims, which cannot contribute to the
“deconstruction, fragmentation, and hence prolongation of removal proceedings”205 because the plaintiff is not entitled to remain in the United States while the suit is pending.206
Although the purpose of the IIRIRA was to expedite the removal process, it was not meant to be at the complete expense of
due process.207 For example, in congressional testimony, the INS
General Counsel stated that “[t]he Administration is committed
to ensuring that aliens in deportation proceedings are afforded
appropriate due process; however, the availability of multiple layers of judicial review has frustrated the timely removal of deportable aliens.”208 And even if one finds Congress’s intent here to be
ambiguous, the Supreme Court has held that “when a particular
interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’
power, [there needs to be] a clear indication that Congress intended that result.”209
Various canons of construction also support interpreting
§ 1252(g) narrowly. One may argue that the INA’s silence on the
breadth of § 1252(g) substantiates the view that Congress intended to bar judicial review of most actions by the INS, but this
argument is weakened by a line of cases that interpreted a similar
provision in the INA narrowly before the IIRIRA. In both Arevalo
v Woods210 and Sanchez v Rowe,211 for example, courts allowed
Bivens and FTCA claims under the old judicial review provision.212
The lack of any text or legislative history indicating that Congress
intended to diverge from past practice suggests that courts should
continue to allow such suits under § 1252(g).213 The INA’s silence
204

American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 US at 487.
Id.
206 8 USC § 1252(b)(3)(B).
207 See St. Cyr, 533 US at 314.
208 Hearing on Removal, 104th Cong, 1st Sess at 15 (statement of T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service) (cited in note 63).
209 St. Cyr, 533 US at 299.
210 811 F2d 487 (9th Cir 1987).
211 651 F Supp 571 (ND Tex 1986).
212 See 8 USC § 1105a.
213 See, for example, Green v Bock Laundry Machine Co, 490 US 504, 521–22 (1989)
(“A party contending that legislative action changed settled law has the burden of showing
that the legislature intended such a change.”).
205
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also pushes in favor of a narrow reading of § 1252(g) because there
is a “longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the [noncitizen].”214
The constitutional avoidance canon may also suggest a narrow reading of the statute. The canon instructs that when courts
face multiple plausible interpretations of a statute, and one of the
interpretations would render the statute unconstitutional, courts
should interpret the statute in a way that is constitutional.215 The
Court applied the constitutional avoidance canon to the IIRIRA
in Immigration and Naturalization Service v St. Cyr,216 holding
the law could not be interpreted to “entirely preclude review of a
pure question of law by any court.”217 For the same reasons as advanced in St. Cyr, the constitutional avoidance canon suggests
that courts ought to construe § 1252(g) narrowly.218 As has been
interpreted by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, § 1252(g) precludes
judicial review over any claim brought by removed noncitizens—
thereby raising a serious constitutional issue. To avoid this dilemma, the constitutional avoidance canon may counsel in favor
of a narrow interpretation of the statute.
Finally, there is a “strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action.”219 In Marbury v Madison,220 Chief
Justice John Marshall insisted that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws.”221 In later cases, the Court has repeatedly
emphasized that administrative action is presumably subject to
judicial review.222 The Court has established that “judicial review
of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off
unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the
purpose of Congress.”223 In Abbott Laboratories v Gardner,224 the
Court stated that “only upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing
214 Immigration and Naturalization Service v Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US 421, 449
(1987) (explaining the immigration rule of lenity).
215 Id. See also Zadvydas v Davis, 533 US 678, 689 (2001) (holding that the constitutional avoidance canon instructs courts to construe the INA to contain an implicit “reasonable time” limitation on a noncitizen’s post-removal detention period).
216 533 US 289 (2001).
217 Id at 300.
218 See id (stating that some judicial intervention in deportation cases is “unquestionably ‘required by the Constitution.’”).
219 St. Cyr, 533 US at 298.
220 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
221 Id at 163.
222 St. Cyr, 533 US at 298.
223 Bowen v Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 US 667, 670 (1986).
224 387 US 136 (1967).
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evidence’ of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict
access to judicial review.”225
At best, it is ambiguous whether Congress intended § 1252(g)
to preclude judicial review of cases by wrongfully removed noncitizens. Congress likely did not consider the possibility that the executive might remove individuals in violation of a court order. Under Supreme Court precedent, this ambiguity pushes in favor of
judicial review. The Court has said, “The mere fact that some acts
are made reviewable should not suffice to support an implication
of exclusion as to others. The right to review is too important to
be excluded on such slender and indeterminate evidence of legislative intent.”226 Additionally, the Court has articulated a
“longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities
in deportation statutes in favor of the alien.”227 This ambiguity
suggests that § 1252(g) should be interpreted narrowly. Perhaps
other circuits should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s “general rule to
resolve any ambiguities in a jurisdiction-stripping statute in favor of the narrower interpretation.”228
In summary, the first principle—that courts should consider
Congress’s objectives when defining the scope of a statute’s capacious language—suggests that § 1252(g) should be interpreted
narrowly. The IIRIRA’s legislative history shows that its purpose
was to expedite the removal process and limit frivolous appeals.
Construing § 1252(g) narrowly is consistent with these goals because noncitizens asserting wrongful removal claims are almost
always asserting damages claims, rather than seeking to prolong
their stay in the United States. Furthermore, the IIRIRA’s legislative history suggests that Congress did not intend for § 1252(g)
to come at the complete expense of due process. Given that there
is no indication that Congress intended for § 1252(g) to preclude
wrongful removal suits, the application of a variety of substantive
canons support a narrow interpretation of the statute.
The second rule from the seven cases229 discussed above is
that courts should eschew applying an “uncritical literalism”
when interpreting a statute. Taken together, the cases suggest

225

Id at 141.
Id (emphasis added, quotation marks omitted).
227 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US at 449.
228 ANA International, 393 F3d at 894.
229 See Jennings, 138 S Ct at 840; Gobeille, 136 S Ct at 943; Electric Power Supply,
136 S Ct at 774; Maracich, 570 US at 49; Dan’s City Used Cars, 569 US at 252; New York
State Conference, 514 US at 656; Celotex, 514 US at 309.
226
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that capacious phrases like “arising from,” “in connection to,” “related to,” and “affecting” should be read with reasonable limitations. In each case, a “hyperliteral” reading of the statute would
allow it to assume a “near-infinite breadth” that violates common
sense.230
Applying this principle here, § 1252(g) should not extend to
cases in which the government wrongfully removes someone from
the United States. Such a broad reading of the provision is a result that “no sensible person could have intended” because it allows the government to remove someone from the United States
in violation of a stay, a statute, or its own regulations without any
mechanism for judicial review.231 Wrongfully removed noncitizens
with salient claims of abuse at the hands of government agents
can seek relief only under a narrow reading of § 1252(g).
This returns us to the hypothetical posed to the government
during oral arguments in Arce. The government conceded that its
interpretation of § 1252(g) would preclude federal jurisdiction
over suits in which the government intentionally and wrongfully
violates a stay of removal.232 This is the type of “uncritical literalism” that the Court cautioned against in Jennings. The plurality
offered three scenarios in which it believed it would still have jurisdiction under § 1252(g): a detained noncitizen wishing to assert
a Bivens claim based on allegedly inhumane conditions of confinement, a detainee bringing a state-law claim for assault against a
guard, and a noncitizen being injured when a truck hits the bus
transporting him to a detention facility.233 Similarly, courts
should also have jurisdiction under § 1252(g) when the government removes someone in violation of a court order, a statute, or
its own regulation. This result comports with common sense and
what we expect a “rational Congress” to legislate.234
The government might respond that a literal interpretation
is not overbroad on the grounds that its application is reasonable
in the vast majority of cases, and applying the literal interpretation to extreme cases amounts to reasonable deference to the executive regarding national security issues. I do not dispute that
§ 1252(g) is valid in most of its applications. Unlike the majority

230
231
232
233
234

Electric Power Supply, 136 S Ct at 774.
Jennings, 138 S Ct at 840.
Oral Argument, Arce at 13:31 (cited in note 2).
Jennings, 138 S Ct at 840.
Dan’s City Used Cars, 569 US at 265.
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of what § 1252(g) precludes, however, there is not a similarly compelling justification for precluding wrongful removal suits. These
suits almost always take the form of damages actions that do not
allow the citizen to remain in the United States while the suit is
pending. They also tend to result from the violation of a courtordered stay, so a neutral magistrate has already determined that
the noncitizen was entitled to remain in the United States (and
hence did not pose a significant national security risk). Therefore,
the government does not have a compelling argument that precluding wrongful removal suits through § 1252(g) is a sensible
interpretation.
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Jennings pointed out that
the three situations discussed by the plurality are distinguishable
because they are challenges stemming from injuries suffered during detention, rather than challenges to the fact of detention.235
However, this distinction is not supported by the IIRIRA’s legislative history, which focuses on expedited procedures236 and frivolous appeals.237 In fact, this distinction seems contrary to the
Act’s legislative history, in which INS counsel stressed that “aliens in deportation proceedings are afforded appropriate due
process.”238
***
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the scope of “capacious language” like “arising from,” “in connection with,” “related to,” or “affecting” should be informed by two legal principles:
First, the statute’s purpose and legislative history should inform
its breadth. If the challenged conduct undermines Congress’s objective in enacting the statute, it is highly likely that the conduct
should not be included under the statute’s capacious language.
Second, courts should avoid reading statutes with “uncritical literalism” such that a strict reading of the language will lead to
results that “no sensible person could have intended.”239 In every

235 Jennings, 138 S Ct at 855 (Thomas concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
236 S Rep No 104-249 at 2 (cited in note 60). See also text accompanying notes 59–65
for a discussion on the legislative history of the IIRIRA.
237 IIRIRA Record, 142 Cong Rec at S10572 (statement of Sen Simpson) (cited in
note 50).
238 Hearing on Removal, 104th Cong, 1st Sess at 15 (statement of T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service) (cited in note 63).
239 Jennings, 138 S Ct at 840, citing Gobeille, 136 S Ct at 943.
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case identified in this Section, the Court has agreed that capacious language should not be read literally so as to cover every
claim that could tenuously be included under the capacious language.
These rules suggest that § 1252(g) should be construed narrowly to allow federal jurisdiction over wrongful removal claims.
First, the purpose of the statute—to facilitate expedient removal
and limit frivolous appeals—is not frustrated by wrongful removal suits because they tend to take the form of damages actions
that do not allow a noncitizen to remain in the United States
while the suit is pending. Similarly, the Act’s legislative history
demonstrates that Congress did not intend for § 1252(g) to extend
to every case that tangentially arises from the Attorney General’s
removal decisions.240 Second, a broad reading of § 1252(g) allows
the statute to extend beyond what any Congress could have reasonably intended.241
There are additional arguments in favor of holding that
§ 1252(g) does not apply to wrongful removal suits. As discussed
in the following Section, the plain language of the statute may not
even be implicated when the Attorney General wrongfully removes someone from the United States.
C.

Wrongful Removal Is Not One of the Three Discrete Actions
That the Attorney General May Take under § 1252(g)

Section 1252(g) only strips federal courts of jurisdiction over
three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: “to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.”242 This Section argues that a lawsuit for wrongful removal
does not arise “from the execution of the removal order,” but it
instead results “from the violation of [a] court’s order” to stay the
removal.243 Modern jurisprudence on the legal effect of stays supports this reasoning.
The argument is grounded in the Supreme Court’s decision
in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee. In describing
the scope of § 1252(g), the Court noted that “petitioners and re-

240

See St. Cyr, 533 US at 299–300.
See Oral Argument, Arce at 13:31 (cited in note 2) (describing a hypothetical in
which ICE agents intentionally remove a foreign national to prevent him from testifying
at trial).
242 8 USC § 1252(g).
243 See Arce, 899 F3d at 800.
241
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spondents have treated § 1252(g) as covering all or nearly all deportation claims. . . . Respondents have described it as applying
to ‘most of what INS does.’”244 The Court went on to say that
§ 1252(g) “applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney
General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’ . . . There are of
course many other decisions or actions that may be part of the
deportation process” that fall outside of the statute.245
The Supreme Court’s precedent on the legal effect of stays
suggests that a lawsuit arising from a wrongful removal does not
fall within the direct scope of § 1252(g) because such a suit is
predicated on the violation of a court order, rather than on a decision or action to execute a removal order. For example, the
plaintiffs in Silva and Arce were suing under the FTCA for a violation of state tort law.246 Rather than seeking damages for a violation of the INA or IIRIRA, the plaintiff in Arce, for example,
sought recovery for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, false arrest, and false imprisonment.247
Violating a stay is not part of the deportation process—nor is
it a decision or action to execute a removal order. A stay “temporarily suspend[s] the source of authority to act,” “either by halting
or postponing some portion of the proceeding, or by temporarily
divesting an order of enforceability.”248 Furthermore, the Court
has held that “[a]n alien seeking a stay of removal pending adjudication of a petition for review does not ask for a coercive order
against the Government, but rather for the temporary setting
aside of the source of the Government’s authority to remove.”249 If
there is no enforceable removal order for the government to execute, then wrongfully removed noncitizens are not suing the government for “execut[ing] removal orders” as required by
§ 1252(g).250
D. Public Policy Supports a Narrow Reading of § 1252(g)
The arguments until now have been derived from Supreme
Court precedent, legislative history, and statutory interpretation.
This Section presents several policy arguments for why § 1252(g)
244
245
246
247
248
249
250

American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 US at 478.
Id at 482 (emphasis added).
Silva, 866 F3d at 941; Arce, 899 F3d at 798.
Arce, 899 F3d at 799.
Nken v Holder, 556 US 418, 428–29 (2009).
Id at 429.
8 USC § 1252(g).
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should be interpreted narrowly. A narrow reading restrains the
executive, prevents harm to noncitizens, and maintains consistency with the presumption in favor of judicial review.
Restricting the scope of § 1252(g) to exclude cases in which
the government wrongfully removes a noncitizen from the United
States forces the executive to abide by court orders, statutes, and
its own regulations. The government conceded during oral arguments in Arce that its interpretation of § 1252(g) would preclude
federal jurisdiction over suits in which the government intentionally and wrongfully violates a stay of removal.251 Allowing federal
jurisdiction in these cases would not only allow the courts to police their behavior, but also would deter the government from
committing these wrongs in the first place.
One could argue that there are other mechanisms in place to
prevent the executive from wrongfully removing noncitizens from
the United States. For example, ICE agents that intentionally violate a stay of removal may face disciplinary action by their supervisors, and the executive would likely face public backlash if it
were to intentionally violate a court order or statute. But internal
disciplinary processes may not adequately hold agents responsible, especially if ICE believes these actions will not typically attract broad public attention.252 The threat of an external, adversarial process like a lawsuit is likely to further deter wrongful
conduct.
Additionally, restricting the scope of § 1252(g) is more likely
to prevent harm to noncitizens. Hundreds of thousands of migrants are swept into ICE custody each year.253 Even when the
government follows all relevant laws and regulations, the deportation process is dehumanizing and humiliating. It is not uncommon for individuals to remain in detention for more than a year.254
251

See Oral Argument, Arce at 13:31 (cited in note 2).
Consider Robert Batey, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations through Police
Disciplinary Reform, 14 Am Crim L Rev 245, 248–52 (1976) (arguing that internal police
disciplinary processes are not sufficient at deterring wrongful police conduct).
253 Gilman, 36 Fordham Intl L Rev at 252–53 (cited in note 12) (“[I]mmigration detention [ ] more than doubled from 209,000 immigration detainees in 2001 to 429,000 immigration detainees in 2011.”).
254 See id at 257–58:
252

[A]n independent study looking at data regarding detention for a single snapshot
day—January 25, 2009—found that ICE detained migrants for an average of at
least eighty-one days. The study further found that ICE held ten percent of detainees in custody pending removal proceedings for longer than six months but
less than a year, and held more than 500 individuals in detention for longer than
a year awaiting final adjudication of their cases.
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Children may be separated from parents, and prison staff may
treat detainees as if they were in punitive custody.255 In fact, ICE
has nine facilities available to detain children who have been separated from adults, and it is estimated that there are more than
ten thousand children in detention.256 Some detention centers are
even run by private companies that stand to profit at the expense
of detainees.257 While this might be an unfortunate consequence
of removal, restricting the scope of § 1252(g) prevents harm to
noncitizens by (1) allowing them to recover damages when they
are wrongfully removed, and (2) possibly reducing the number of
wrongful deportations.
CONCLUSION
This Comment argues in favor of a narrow interpretation of
8 USC § 1252(g), which states that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising
from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against
any alien under this chapter.”258 I suggest that courts should interpret § 1252(g) narrowly so that it does not cover cases in which
the Attorney General removes someone from the United States in
violation of a court order, a statute, or a government regulation.
This conclusion is rooted in the INA and IIRIRA’s legislative histories, the purpose of their jurisdiction-stripping provisions,
Supreme Court precedent, and public policy considerations.
More specifically, this Comment has made four discrete arguments in favor of a narrow interpretation of § 1252(g). First,
Supreme Court precedent and the IIRIRA’s legislative history
suggest that § 1252(g) may only apply to the Attorney General’s
discretionary decisions.259 If § 1252(g) only covers discretionary
decisions, then suits stemming from wrongful removal will not be
precluded from judicial review because government officials do
255 See Brané and Lundholm, 22 Georgetown Immig L J at 162 (cited in note 15)
(“[W]hen interviewed by the Office of the Inspector General, five Bureau of Prison (BOP)
officials did not know that standards specifically applicable to ICE detainees existed, and
so corrections officers were trained to treat detainees the same as inmates.”).
256 Mona Chalabi, How Many Migrant Children Are Detained in US Custody? (The
Guardian, Dec 22, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/AK4L-6WHU (“The New York Times
reported in September [2018] that 12,800 children were in federally contracted shelters
based on information that had been reported to members of Congress. Updated estimates
published earlier this week now put that number at 15,000.”).
257 Urbi, Here’s Who’s Making Money (cited in note 16).
258 8 USC § 1252(g).
259 American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 US at 487.
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not have the discretion to violate the law, court orders, or the
Constitution.260
Second, Supreme Court precedent suggests that “capacious”
phrases like “arising from,” “in connection with,” “related to,” and
“affecting” should be read sensibly—courts should eschew an “uncritical literalism” when determining the breadth of these
phrases—and courts should consider the statute’s purpose and
legislative history when interpreting its breadth.261 Section 1252(g)’s purpose was to increase expediency and to avoid
frivolous lawsuits. But suits stemming from wrongful removal do
not challenge the fact of removal and are much more likely to take
the form of damages actions.262 Consequently, a noncitizen asserting a damages action like an FTCA or Bivens claim against the
government for wrongful removal would not receive an automatic
stay that allows them to remain in the United States while the
suit was pending.263 Consequently, the solution most consistent
with Supreme Court precedent is to exclude wrongful removals
from the scope of § 1252(g).
Third, wrongful removal is not one of the three discrete actions that the Attorney General is authorized to make under
§ 1252(g). Because stays “temporarily suspend[ ] the source of authority to act” on removal orders,264 a wrongfully removed noncitizen is not suing the government for “execut[ing] removal orders”
as required by the statute.265
Finally, public policy favors a narrow reading of § 1252(g).
The interpretation that I propose restrains the executive and
helps to protect noncitizens from harm. It is also consistent with
the strong presumption in favor of judicial review and the “general rule to resolve ambiguities in a jurisdiction-stripping statute
in favor of the narrower interpretation.”266
To return to the opening hypothetical, imagine that a noncitizen has a claim against ICE agents for detainee abuse, but those
agents remove him in violation of a court order so that he cannot
260

See note 93.
See Jennings, 138 S Ct at 840.
262 Arce, 899 F3d at 799; Silva, 866 F3d at 939.
263 This also addresses Justice Thomas’s concern with the plurality’s jurisdictional
holding in Jennings. See 138 S Ct at 855 (Thomas concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (distinguishing between challenges to the fact of detention and claims about
injuries suffered during detention, and concluding that suits about the latter should go
forward).
264 Nken v Holder, 556 US 418, 428–29 (2009).
265 8 USC § 1252(g).
266 See St. Cyr, 533 US at 298.
261
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testify against them. A court in the Fifth or Eighth Circuit could
not review their action. But the solution I have proposed would
not prevent courts from reviewing this injustice.

